the best known example is the 2004 French law banning students, parents and teachers from wearing hijabs (and other "ostentatious" religious symbols) in public schools. 3 Meanwhile, several German states have made it illegal for school teachers to wear headscarves, and the city of Maaseik in Belgium banned the wearing of the burqa. 4 More recently, the French are considering a ban on full-face veils, 5 while laws targeting the burqa are under consideration in Belgium, Quebec, and the canton of Aargau in Switzerland. 6 Nor is the anti-Muslim sentiment limited to clothing. Germany and Denmark have used citizenship examinations to force Muslims to swear allegiance to European values. 7 In addition, there have been efforts to prevent the construction of mosques in central cities. 8 Supporters of anti-Muslim laws and policies often portray them as a necessary defense against an Islamic threat, a threat that draws from a post-1945 Cold War perspective. 10 Muslim religious leaders are branded as "fascists" and the Muslim headscarf becomes a symbol of totalitarianism; meanwhile, those who oppose publishing the Mohammed cartoons are decried as "appeasers."
11 On one level, this framing makes sense, since it reflects the historical experience of Europeans over the last hundred years. But it also has problems of its own. For one thing, the demands made by Muslims are religious as well as political. Furthermore, equating Islam with Europe's greatest inner demons overstates whatever challenges Muslims may pose to European liberalism while making compromise less likely. 12 This paper proposes an alternate frame. What if Muslims-rather than being Soviets or Nazis in training-are the new Catholics? During the second half of the nineteenth century, a struggle erupted between Catholics and liberals over schools, civil marriage, and burial 13 -the same issues at the center of the current debates in Europe. The key event of this struggle was the German Kulturkampf (1871-1887), during which Otto von Bismarck, at the head of a coalition of German liberals and nationalists, led a campaign to separate German Catholics from the "reactionary" influences of the Papacy. The means included restrictions on minarets 12 When, however, Muslims turn the analogy around and present themselves as victims of Nazi style polices, there are often sharp complaints. For example, Fereshta Ludin, the Afghani-born schoolteacher and litigant in the Ludin case-which held that German states could ban teachers wearing headscarves-compared her situation to that of Jews "just before the Holocaust." In response, local Christian Democrat politicians wanted to prosecute her for Holocaust denial. Kahn, supra note 10, at 433 For more background on the argument that Muslims are going to be the next victims of the Holocaust, see NACHMANI, supra note 7, at 132-40. Interestingly, the German citizenship test contains no questions about the Holocaust, Id. at 140. 13 differed from those favored by Protestants. 19 As we shall see, some of the concerns raised about European Muslims are quite similar. 20 Finally, to strike a proscriptive note, the anti-Catholic laws ultimately failed. For one thing, the laws often did not achieve their stated goals. 21 Bismarck's laws failed to separate German Catholics from a "reactionary" Rome, while in the United States the clerical garb laws did not prevent Catholics from teaching in the public schools. Nor did the anti-Catholic laws and policies succeed in isolating Catholics from the rest of society. Here lies a hope for the future-if the United States and Germany could come to terms with Catholicism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the same ought to be true of Europeans learning how to live with Muslims today.
The rest of this article explores the Catholic/Muslim comparison in greater depth. Part II looks at how supporters of the Kulturkampf and clerical garb laws in the United States viewed the "threat" posed by Catholics. Part III turns to contemporary Europe and argues that many of the arguments used in today's debates over Islam are similar to the antiCatholic discourse of the Kulturkampf. Part IV switches the focus to the law in action and recounts the practical difficulties that arose when the Kulturkampf and bans on clerical garb were enforced. Part V uses these practical difficulties of past clothing bans to raise a series of questions about the current European bans on the headscarf and burqa. Finally, the article closes on a hopeful note-the successful integration of Catholics in present day Germany and the United States today suggests that the fears behind the anti-Muslim laws and policies are overstated. th century was already a major European power. 28 To the southeast stood the Habsburg Empire, a Catholic state that occupied many territories including present day Austria and the Czech Republic, both of which had large German speaking populations. 29 As the idea of nationalism spread across Europe in the nineteenth century, Germans debated between a "large" Germany that would include the calling for new anti-terrorism referred to the struggle against terrorism as "a Kulturkampf in Bismarck's terms" William Rees-Mogg, This time we were lucky. This time, THE TIMES (London), July, 2, 2007. 24 During the last quarter of the nineteenth century there were major conflicts between Catholics and secular liberals in France, Belgium and Switzerland. See Clark and Kaiser, supra note 32, at 1-2. 25 ROSS, supra note, 14 at 4-8. 26 Id. at 7. According to Ross by 1880 "more than half of Prussia's Catholic episcopate was in exile or prison, nearly a quarter of all parish priest were without pastors, and a third or more of all religious houses and congregations had been suppressed." In addition Catholic civil servants were demoted or lost their jobs and rank and file Catholics found it hard to find priests to administer the sacraments. 29 The Habsburg Empire also included a large number of non-German minorities which weakened its claim to speak as a defender of German power. PASSANT, supra note 28, at 8-9.
II. THE
German lands of the Habsburg Empire and a "small" Germany that would leave them out. 30 In the 1860s matters came to a head and by 1871 a new German Empire had arisen, one that excluded the Habsburg lands and was dominated by Prussia. 31 The unification process saw the new German state fight wars with Austria (1866) and France (1870-71)-both Catholic powers. Catholics now made up 36% of the German population. 32 Moreover, while its supporters believed they were fighting against "reactionary" Catholicism, the Kulturkampf itself was a reaction to a reinvigorated Catholic Church. The mid-nineteenth century saw a considerable Catholic popular mobilization, including increases in the membership in Catholic institutions, as well as a new popular piety involving relics, plaster saints, and public rituals that made Protestants and some middle-class Catholics uncomfortable. 33 Meanwhile, Catholics were able to use the new democratic institutions established in the wake of the liberal revolution of 1848 that swept across the German states to gain a measure of political power. 34 In 1870-the year before Bismarck began instituting anti-Catholic laws-the Catholic-based Center Party won a massive electoral victory in the Prussian parliament. 35 Added to this was the new assertiveness of the Papacy-as seen by the Syllabus of Errors (1864), which indicted liberal society, and the Decree on Papal Infallibility (1870), which suggested that the ultimate authority for German Catholics lay not in Berlin, but Rome.
36
While the renewed Catholic assertiveness of the mid-nineteenth century might have justified some response, German liberals exaggerated the threat and stereotyped Catholics in ways followers of the current European debates over Islam will find familiar. First, German liberals cast the concern about Catholics in demographic terms. For example, they 30 worried about high Catholic birthrates and conversions through mixedmarriages. 37 These concerns remained robust even though Prussian authorities acknowledged that the Catholic population was not increasing and, in fact, most of the offspring of Catholic-Protestant marriages were being raised as Protestants.
38
Added to the demographic concerns were ethno-racial ones. During the nineteenth century the German Empire included several provinces with large Polish minorities including West Prussia and Silesia. Meanwhile, in Posen the Poles made up 60% of the population. 39 The Poles were almost entirely Catholic, and there concerns that German Poles would revolt, as they had in Russian Poland a few years earlier. 40 Because the Poles were overwhelmingly Catholic, German nationalists viewed Catholicism with suspicion. For example, when a celebration of the Papal Jubilee in 1871 was held in the Polish language, nationalists worried about "the Polish tendencies of the Catholic hierarchy."
41
A third set of arguments involved categorizing the Church as antimodern. One argument focused on the growth of popular rituals. As noted, these rituals-which Drury 42 refers to as "devotional kitsch"-made Protestants and middle class Catholics uncomfortable. This was largely for class reasons. German middle class culture shied away from the culture of display typical of ultramontane Catholics. 43 This was especially true of liberal Protestants-who were moving in the direction of a more secular, cultural view of religion. 44 a day for Beethoven and museums, Catholics spent their leisure time on numerous feast days as well as on "drunken and riotous" trips to pilgrimage sites. 45 In addition, there was a broader complaint that Catholics were superstitious and believed in miracles. 46 The presence of such "backward" views among a large segment of the population confounded the claim that Germany was a modern nation. Added to this were economic claimsCatholics were underrepresented in schools, had low incomes, worked in marginal areas of the economy, and were generally excluded from the elites of society. 47 While one might think that such arguments would lay the basis for egalitarian reform, the response in Germany of the 1870s was to combat "Catholic backwardness, provincialism and cultural inferiority." 48 In this atmosphere, anti-Catholic horror stories flourished. Catholicism was associated with Jesuit conspiracies (including one supposedly responsible for the death of a lion at the Berlin zoo), wild stories of nuns and priests disregarding their vows of celibacy, and cruelty toward school children. 49 These stories could lead to violence as occurred during the 1869 Moabit riots in which a mob of thousands attacked a Dominican chapel in Berlin after the priest was accused of sexual misconduct.
50 Anti-Catholic sentiment also found expression in the cartoons of Wilhelm Busch, whose book-length comic strip, Pater Filucius, satirized an avaricious Jesuit. 51 Withheld for two years by German authorities because of fears it might offend Catholics, Pater Filucius was a best seller on its release in 1872.
52
A final strand of support for the Kulturkampf came from those who saw Catholics as agents of the Pope. The Catholic Encyclopedia, explaining this aspect of anti-Catholic thought, blamed it in part on Bismarck's jealousy-at the very moment Bismarck's Prussia succeeded in "restor[ing] to Germany its former imperial grandeur" Rome declared 45 Id. at 118-19. 46 ROSS, supra note 14, at 18. 47 Id. at 23-24.The socio-economic claims of Kulturkampf supporters sparked a debate in the late nineteenth century and played a formative role in Max Weber's thought. For a summary of the debate, see Drury, supra note 32, at 121-35. 48 Id. 49 Id. at 19-20. 50 German liberals saw the Kulturkampf as part of a larger power struggle between the Papacy and the Empire. 56 In this struggle German Catholics were either pawns, who were encouraged to break from the ultramontane policies of Pius IX, or a "foreign element" in the German body politic. 57 The same forces that inspired the Kulturkampf also were present in the United States, a country that, like Germany, combined Protestant dominance with a large Catholic minority.
58 While organized antiCatholicism was present in American public life from the arrival of German and Irish Catholics in the 1830s until well into the twentieth century, 59 the passage of clerical garb laws in the late nineteenth century casts an interesting light on the current debate over Muslim teachers wearing headscarves.
As in the German example, part of the pressure for anti-Catholic laws was party-political. This can be seen in the debate during the mid1870s over the Blaine Amendment which, had it passed, would have amended the Religion Clause of the First Amendment to ban public 53 Spahn, supra note 34. 54 Drury, supra note 32, at 114. 55 Id. 56 In his March 10, 1873 speech to the German House of Lords, Bismarck argued that the struggle with the Catholic Church was not "confessional," but "political." As such, it was part of "the age-old struggle between kingship and priesthood" one that "shaped the German history in the Middle Ages ...in the form of the conflict between emperors and popes." Otto von Bismarck, Speech to the Prussian House of Lords, http://www.zum.de./psm/imperialismus/bismarck3e.php (1873). Bismarck made the same point the previous year when he announced to the Reichstag that "we shall not go to Canossa" -a reference to German Emperor Henry IV, who in 1077 went to the Italian town and stood for three days bareheaded in the snow to submit to Papal authority. ROSS, supra note 14, at 24-25. 57 AMERICA (1964) support for parochial education. 60 The amendment was the creature of James Blaine, who sought the Republican nomination for President in 1876 and believed that taking a stand against "sectarian" (i.e. Catholic) education would cement a relationship between Protestantism and the Republican Party. 61 This was not an isolated example-then Ohio Governor Rutherford B. Hayes won re-election in 1874 by linking the Democrats to Catholic plotters. 62 In the 1876 election the Republicans tried to tar the Democrats nominee, New York Governor Samuel Tilden, as too closely linked with the New York Catholic hierarchy. 63 Meanwhile, Rhode Island considered legislation that would make it illegal to "dissuade" a parent from sending children to a public school.
64
While the Blaine Amendment ultimately failed, 65 the several states, including New York, Pennsylvania, Missouri and Indiana, passed laws making it illegal for teachers to wear clerical clothing while teaching schools. 66 The authors of these laws shared many of the same stereotyped views of Catholics as the supporters of the Kulturkampf-concerns that, in turn, parallel arguments European liberals and secularists use against hijab-wearers. For example, supporters argued that nuns, a major target of the clerical garb laws, by taking an oath of poverty lacked the moral independence necessary to teach children. 67 There was also a debate over whether nuns wore their clothing as a matter of choice 68 and whether a ban on the nun's habit was necessary to preserve the state. 69 Muslim headscarf is not the failure of the European democracies to fight totalitarians in the years before and after World War II, but rather Europe's long history of intolerance toward outsiders, including-for Protestant Europe of the 1870s-Catholics. What follows is an overview of the key similarities between the anti-Catholic prejudices of the Kulturkampf and the anti-Muslim bias that informs today's debate.
Like their nineteenth century predecessors, supporters of the twenty-first century "culture war" express alarm at the "demographic surge" of Muslims, which-they claim-will result in the creation of "Eurabia."
71 And, as in the Kulturkampf, Europe's "defenders" tend to overstate the number of European Muslims. So, although Muslims are no more than 10% of the population in any European country, opponents warn that one day-sooner rather than later-Europe will have a majority Muslim population.
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Niall Ferguson, echoing similar fears about demographics, added that when he sees a minaret in Europe, the image it conjures up is one of "decline and fall." 73 Of course, these concerns about demographics-even if true-only make sense if one assumes a fortiori that Muslim migrants are not Europeans (otherwise, why should an increase in Muslims suggest a decline?). This is similar to the view of the German liberals for whom Catholics are irredeemably foreign.
Nor is there any lack of ethno-racism among today's culture warriors. Just as Bismarck and his supporters worried about the "revolutionary" potential of the Poles, opponents of the headscarf laws worry about the impact of Muslims on to disrupt European society. 74 Just as Bismarck and the German nationalists feared revolution and a Polish take over, opponents of the hijab and burqa associate it with a rejection of assimilation. 75 The United States experience with the clerical garb laws also parallels many of the concerns raised by opponents of the headscarf. As in the United States, Europeans have debated whether the headscarf states a fact (that the wearer is Muslim) or sends a proselytizing message. 89 In fact, in the 2003 Ludin case the court appointed experts to answer this very question. 90 There was also a considerable debate about the freedom of the wearer. Just as people asked whether a nun, by virtue of her vows, as a 83 Rose, supra note 9. 84 This, at least is how the debate worked out in Germany. Supporters of the hijab countered by pointing out that headscarf wearers worked in a number of modern professions-including as teachers. Kahn, supra note 10, at 431. 85 117-19 (2008) . 89 This was a major issue in the Ludin case, see Kahn, supra note 10, at 418-19. 90 Id. at 427. pawn of the church, opponents of the headscarf often argue it is often worn out of family pressure.
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The headscarf-like the nun's habit-is seen as a threat to the preservation of the state. In both cases opponents worried about neutrality. Just as the Catholic nun teaching in the public school violated the U.S. constitutional understanding of church-state separation, the German teacher who wears a headscarf violates the German tradition of an independent civil service. 92 And, in both cases, this neutrality was partially a pretext. As the debate in the United States over the Blaine Amendment shows, separation of church and state was a political argument used by the Republican Party to gain Catholic votes. Likewise, the concerns about civil service neutrality in Germany masked a larger debate about the role of Islam in society.
What accounts for the similarities between the anti-Catholic arguments made during the Kulturkampf and the current anti-Muslim arguments made in Europe today? This is a complex and under-researched question. One intriguing possibility, however, has been offered by Peter O'Brien, an expert on anti-Islamic movements, is the inability of liberals to deal with groups they cannot convert to their cause. 93 According to O'Brien:
Muslims irk the European liberal because they refuse to convert, even after generations. They congregate in ethnic ghettos, form their own exclusive organizations. They forbid their children to attend public schools or attend Qura'n schools to unlearn what is taught in the public schools. They wear distinctive clothes. 94 The same could have been said of the nineteenth century Catholics. During that period, liberals on both sides of the Atlantic responded with legal restrictions. How effective were these laws? What does this say about current laws targeting Muslims? To those questions we now turn.
IV.
THE Acting on the anti-Catholic sentiments described above Bismarck enacted a series of restrictive laws during the 1870s. In 1871 he passed a law making it illegal to make political speeches from the pulpit. 95 The following year he excluded members of religious orders from teaching in the public schools. 96 The May Laws of 1873-perhaps the key measure of the Kulturkampf-placed the training and appointment of clergy in the hands of the state. 97 Other laws banned the Jesuits and required civil marriage.
98 By these means, Bismarck and the national liberals had hoped to create a new German Catholic-i.e. a moderate-who would support Berlin, rather than Rome.
Kulturkampf supporters hoped for a "quick and easy victory over the church."
99 Bismarck and his allies were convinced that the declaration of Papal infallibility had split German Catholics. 100 And, in fact, there was discontent in German Catholic circles. A group of "Old Catholics"-made up of academics, civil servants, and other members of the middle classdid break away from the Church during the 1870s. 101 The Old Catholics opposed what they saw as Rome's usurpation of German political sovereignty.
102 They also removed those elements of Catholic religious practice-including the Latin Mass, auricular confessions, clerical celibacy, and the cult of saints-that German liberals found problematic. 103 As such the Old Catholics looked like ideal allies in Bismarck's campaign against the Pope.
These hopes proved illusory. Even at their peak in the mid1870s, the Old Catholics never made up more than one percent of the Catholic population in Germany. 104 There were two reasons for this. First, while the Old Catholics captured some of the elite, they lacked the support of the rank and file. The same changes in ritual that made the liberals were happy kept the Catholic masses away-especially at a time when the Church as a whole was under attack. 105 Second, for all the German liberals' talk of modernizing Catholicism, the state's financial support for Center party grew noticeably during the 1870s. 116 The development of a powerful, assertive Catholic political party further weakened support for the Kulturkampf. 117 Although diplomatic negotiations between Berlin, Rome, and German Catholics lingered into the 1880s, the period of active repression was over by 1878. There were several external reasons for this including the death of Pius IX and political alliance between the German Empire and Catholic Austria-Hungary-thus ending Germany's fears of encirclement by hostile Catholic powers. 118 But equally important were conservative Protestant protests, the growing strength of the Center Party, and a general sense of exhaustion. 119 Meanwhile, if the goal of the Kulturkampf was the isolation of German Catholics, it failed. Writing in 1908 the author of the Catholic Encyclopedia entry concluded: "One important consequence of the Kulturkampf was the earnest endeavor of the Catholics to obtain a greater influence in national and municipal affairs; how weak they were in both respects was clear to them only after the great conflict had begun." 120 Likewise, in the United States prosecutions against wearers of clerical garb also encountered pragmatic difficulties. A good example of this is Hysong v. Gallitzin Borough School District. 121 The case involved the town of Gallitzin, population 3,000, which was roughly 80% Catholic. Several nuns were employed as teachers at the public school. 122 Protestant students and parents sued, arguing that this practice violated Article 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which-in the spirit of the Blaine Amendment-made it illegal to spend public money in support of "any sectarian school." 123 According to the Protestant plaintiffs the nuns wore their "garb, insignia, and emblems…in such a manner as to impart to the children under their instruction certain religious and sectarian lessons [.] " 124 The plaintiffs also expressed concern that the nuns, by renouncing their worldly names, subjected themselves to church discipline. The plaintiffs also alleged that the nuns were unable to converse with males over 14 years old-which, they claimed, would prevent the teaching of hygiene. In applying the law to a case involving a Sikh, the Oregon Supreme Court stressed that obligation of a teacher to adhere to religious neutrality was not limited to members of the majority religion. Id at 376. It then added that-while the plaintiff's dress may seem like "an exotic curiosity"-one must also keep in mind that, given "[t]he tides of immigration and home grown religions," what the court finds "exotic today may tomorrow gain many thousands of adherents and potential majority status in some communities." Id. at 377. In reaching reach this conclusion, the court mentioned the Know-Nothing movement of the midnineteenth century and the Blaine Amendment-both expressions of anti-Catholic nativism. Id. Oddly enough, it saw these events as a reason to support the law, since they showed how easily religious beliefs could give rise to the type of "contention" that imperils religious neutrality. Id. 141 See Betsy Hammond, Oregon Governor Signs repeal on teachers' religious dress, THE OREGONIAN, Apr. 1, 2010. The effort for repeal was lead by a broad coalition of interfaith and civil rights groups but was opposed by the Oregon ACLU, which warned that repeal risked endangering the "religious neutrality" of public schools. teacher, sought unemployment benefits after she was dismissed from her job as a school teacher in response to her wearing a religious head covering. The state benefits office argued that the head covering was an expression of McGlothin's Ethiopian cultural background-therefore she was not dismissed from her job because of her religion and was not entitled to benefits. 148 In rejecting this argument, the Court held that McGlothin was dismissed on religious grounds even though: (1) the Hebrew Israelite group to which she belonged did not require that women wear headdresses; (2) she did not regularly attend church services; and (3) she was "selective" in wearing the head covering. 149 In part the court seemed moved by the its rejection of the school district's rationale in terminating McGlothin-that she would not be able to teach classes in health and hygiene. 150 While the story of the clerical garb laws may lack the drama of the Kulturkampf, two themes emerge: (1) given the prevalence of religious clothing across a large number of faiths, laws that single out the clothing of Catholics (or Muslims) are increasingly likely to be seen as discriminatory; and (2) because people wear clothing for a wide variety of reasons, courts encounter great difficulty in determining whether a given item is, in fact, worn for religious reasons.
V. FOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT TODAY'S ANTI-HEADSCARF LAWS
What then do the experiences of Germany and the United States in legislating against public expressions of Catholicism suggest about Europe's anti-headscarf laws? Here are four speculative conclusions. First, will the headscarf and burqa bans achieve the goal of "integrating" European Muslims? If by "integration" one means separating "moderate" Muslims from their more extremist counterparts, the answer is most likely "no." Just as the imposition of the Kulturkampf made the Catholic rank-and-file less receptive to the Old Catholics message, it is hard to see how banning the headscarf will win over ordinary Muslims. Instead, bans will increase the likelihood that those women who continue to wear the headscarf (or burqa) will learn to see it not only as a religious duty but also as a symbol of resistance to secular Western society. Second, can the bans be enforced? As a practical matter, bans on religious behavior are very difficult to enforce. Religious practices, like wearing the headscarf, are deeply held. They are part of daily life-even if, as in the case of Deborah McGlothin, they are incorporated selectively. As a result, restrictions encounter deep resistance. A comparison to the hate speech context is instructive. A ban on hate speech works politically because, in general, no one in society claims to be in favor of hate. As a result, the laws-even if they are ineffective-are not likely to antagonize any group in society.
By contrast, when Europeans ban the burqa or headscarf because it is a sign of "political Islam," "totalitarianism" or "extremism"-in the manner of the Kulturkampf and anti-Catholic hysteria in the United States-they insult Muslims even before the laws are enforced. Oddly for secular liberals, who generally seek to separate what one does in private with what one does in public, 153 there is a great desire to unpack the meaning of the headscarf. Wouldn't it be more consistent with the liberal separation of public and private to ban the specific bad things the headscarf is said to represent-honor killing, terrorism, etc-rather than to ban a clothing item many women wear for completely "innocent" reasons?
Third, there is a question any society that seeks to ban religious clothing needs to worry about-the scope of the ban. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Hysong was troubled because the Protestants as well as Catholics wore religious clothing. 154 Likewise, interpreters of the Federal Constitutional Court in Ludin debated whether the German states that banned the headscarf must also ban the crucifix. 155 The stakes in this debate are high. Banning the headscarf alone raises questions of religious discrimination; banning the headscarf and crucifix (and other religious symbols) risks pushing society in an overly secular direction. The latter A fourth set of questions are definitional. While it is certainly possible to ban headscarf wearing as such, the tendency has been to focus on the motivation of the wearer, the impact on the audience (school children in the case of teachers), and the message wearing the headscarf sends to the larger society. As Reads and McGlothin show, these are not easy questions. Should the ban apply where the garment is worn selectively, for non religious reasons by someone who is unaffiliated with a religious group? Should the ban apply to some one who, while religious in other respects, wears the garment as a "fashion statement?" And how can a court-or anyone else-determine whether school children interpret a headscarf as a statement of the fact their teacher is Muslim, as opposed to an effort to convert them to Islam? While these questions may appear speculative, the large number of Muslim women who wear the headscarf in public guarantee that they will make their way into courts and administrative tribunals. 157 
VI. CONCLUSION: LOOKING TOWARDS THE FUTURE
Despite these practical difficulties, the current trend in European politics favors bans on Islamic clothing. 158 The bans draw support from a view that such clothing is, to use the words of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, "contrary to our values and contrary to the ideals we have of a woman's dignity." 159 As we have seen, in the late 19 th century similar concerns were raised about the nun's habit in the United States. 160 Today, however, concerns about the nuns habit, if expressed at all, are much fainter. Instead, at a time when bans on Islamic clothing are on the rise in Europe and elsewhere, anti-Catholic laws are notable for their obscurity. Viewed from the vantage point of the twenty-first century, the anti-Catholicism of the Kulturkampf and clerical garb laws looks antiquated. While pockets of anti-Catholicism persist in the United States and Europe, the general picture has changed remarkably. The current government of the Federal Republic of Germany is led by the Christian Democrats, a successor to the German Center Party which combines 156 Id. at 430. 157 In future work I want to show more direct parallels between the anti-Catholic laws of the nineteenth century and the current laws targeting Muslims. One interesting overlap involves citizenship. Just as Germany and Denmark today are requiring Muslims to take citizenship tests, the May Laws of 1873 required clergy to pass examinations in philosophy and related subjects. See ROSS, supra note 13, at 55. 158 See Erlanger supra note 2. 159 Id. (quoting Sarkozy). 160 See supra notes 67-70, 89-92 and accompanying text.
